By Alexander Ermakov, independent military expert
Part II. Naval Component
The naval component of a modern nuclear triad is represented with nuclear submarines, which are one of the most impressive engineering developments and, at the same time, the most invisible national defence components operating in the silence of the deep sea.
First Experiments
The interest in installing nuclear weapon (NW) systems on naval ships was aroused by a large number of practical and political considerations. For the USSR that did not have a large number of air bases abroad, the opportunity to deploy nuclear weapon carriers close to the U.S. territory was very attractive. For the USA, this opportunity was also useful as it allowed to attack the USSR with additional forces and from unexpected directions. The inter-branch competition in the U.S. armed forces was an extra intensifier for the development of naval NW carriers. With its armadas of aircraft carriers and battleships, the U.S. Navy, justifiably considering its contribution to the victory over Japan as the key one, was suddenly sidelined by the Air Force that became an independent branch of military forces only in 1947! It is reasonable that nuclear weapon was primarily implemented into the core component of the U.S. Navy - aircraft carriers. In 1949, the P2V-3C Neptune originally developed as a land-based jet-assisted takeoff aircraft became the first ship-based aircraft able to carry nuclear weapon. Only 12 Neptune aircraft were modified and they were able to take off only from three Midway-class aircraft carriers. This large aircraft hampered flight operations of other aircraft included in the air group and was not able to land on an aircraft carrier – the Neptune pilots had to fly to a land air-field or bail out. In the 1950s such special-purpose ship-based bomber aircraft carrying nuclear weapons as the AJ Savage, A-3 Skywarrior jet aircraft and ahead-of-its-time A-5 Vigilante were developed.
However, using an aircraft as a nuclear weapon carrier has evident disadvantages because it requires an aircraft carrier and can be shot down. The reasonable solution here is to equip naval ships with fast developing rocketry. As early as 1947, the USA carried out the test launch of the captured German V-2 missile from Midway aircraft carrier’s deck, but this test nearly resulted in a fatal accident and proved that substitute products were unfit for application. Besides, the range of the first missile weapon prototypes forced ships to come to enemy coastlines as close as practically possible. That is why submarines were chosen as the best solution for carrying nuclear weapon.
The USSR immediately focused on this trend. Shortly after the end of the World War II, Soviet specialists were working on the P-2 submarine project to be armed with the R-1 ballistic missiles (duplicates of the V-2 missile, of course, without the nuclear warhead); however, they quickly figured out that the R-1 missile was not fit for the application. By the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union considerably advanced in the development of rocketry. In particular, the R-11 liquid-fuelled missile was developed, offering the range similar to the R-1 missile, a smaller weight (2-3 times lighter than the R-1) and a more serviceable oxidizing agent instead of liquid oxygen. In January 1954, it was decided to develop the R-11FM version based on the R-11 missile for naval applications. After tests by means of a ship’s motion simulation test bed, on September 16, 1955, for the first time in the history, the modified Project 611 B-67 submarine performed the ballistic missile underwater launching. In 1957–1958, additional 5 submarines based on the modified AV-611 Project have been built.
The critical disadvantages of the first Soviet missile-carrying nuclear submarines were a small amount of munitions (two missiles), a short missile range (about 150 km), and a diesel-electric power plant that required regular surfacing for battery charging. The possibility to launch missiles in surface condition only was often mentioned as another disadvantage, but it should be noted that surfacing was needed only five minutes before launch. Some disadvantages were quickly eliminated in the Project 629 submarines armed with three R-13 missiles with the extended range of 600 km. The Project 629 submarines became the first Soviet large-series missile-carrying submarines – in 1959–1962 the Soviet Navy received 23 of them.
At the same time, submarines were equipped with CM. The USA achieved certain success with the ship- and submarine-launched Regulus CM. Although the Regulus missiles were soon replaced with SLBM, the submarines armed with the Regulus became history because from 1957 till 1960 they were the only submarines performing combat alert missions as the naval component of the U.S. SNF. The U.S. submarine fleet began to use CMs largely only after the development of multi-purpose small-sized Tomahawk CMs. In the USSR, CMs were initially considered to be anti-ship weapons. Only the first CMs - the P-5 missiles (tests began in 1957) may be classified as missiles intended to hit coast targets only. In 1960, under Project 644, the first six submarines were armed with two R-5 missiles. At that time, these missiles were comparable to BM by the range (450-650 km), but the rapid progress in development of the latter resulted in depriving CMs of their status as the Soviet Union’s SNF component. But the development of heavy CMs for CMCNSs did not stop - these missiles are still considered to be the major weapon against surface ships. Equivalent to the Tomahawk missile, the S-10 Granat system was developed just before the collapse of the USSR. Now, the Kalibr system is its successor.
The Birth of the Gold Standard
However, today’s SNF naval component could not have reached the current level without solving two key problems - to provide the possibility for long-time underwater operations of SUBs and for launching SLBMs in submerged condition. Despite the fact that the first SLBMs were developed in the USSR, the USA was the first country that had accomplished this task, first and foremost, due to Lockheed rocket engineers, who had developed solid-fuel Polaris missile that was well ahead of its time. The Polaris missile combined relatively small overall dimensions and an underwater launching option, plus a sufficient range (the first modification had a range of 1,800 km approx.).
The progress in nuclear power plants’ development allowed to build the first nuclear submarines able to perform long-time combat alert missions underwater: the SSN-571 Nautilus in the USA in 1955, the K-3 Leninsky Komsomol (Project 627) in the USSR in 1958. The first SSBNs were based on multirole nuclear submarines. The first SSBN was the American SSBN-598 George Washington based on multirole Skipjack-class nuclear submarines. This SSBN was put into service on December 30, 1959. The first underwater launching of the Polaris missile was performed on July 20, 1960; the George Washington SSBN performed its first patrol mission at the end of that year. Each SSBNs of this class carried 16 SLBMs, i.e. the amount of missiles was nearly five times greater than the Soviet equivalents had at that time.
The K-19 submarine developed under Project 658 (based on Project 627) became the first Soviet SSBN that was put into service almost a year after the George Washington submarine. The first Soviet SSBNs were armed with the three R-13 missiles similar to the armament for the diesel submarines (Project 629). They had the default missile launching mode in surface condition. In the USSR, the first experimental underwater launching of SLBM (modified R-11FM) was performed from the B-67 submarine on September 10, 1960. The program for modernization of Soviet SSBNs into a missile system equipped with underwater-launched R-21 SLBM was started in 1963. The launch range of the R-21 missile had reached 1,400 km along with the reduced pre-start preparation time, but the problem of a small amount of munitions persisted. In 1967, the Project 667A submarines became the first SSBNs with performance comparable to its American equivalents. These submarines armed with 16 R-27 SLBMs (range 2,400 km) became the first submarines classified as BMSs.
Further development of SSBNs was focused on the enhancement of their endurance due to a reduced noise level and a higher range of SLBMs. This allowed to extend the distance between their patrol areas and enemy coastlines. The missile range growth had reached its logical limit in the 1980s when SLBMs with the full intercontinental range were developed. Now, when starting its patrol mission, a SSBN does not intend to approach the target, but rather leaves the area of potential attack on naval bases. Patrol areas are located near friendly coastlines, in the so-called “havens” (widely known as strongholds) protected by coast air and naval forces. This makes the mission of assured destruction of patrolling SSBNs before missile launching practically impossible for the enemy. Thus, SSBNs are the most stable component of SNF that guarantees the ability to deliver a counterstrike and, therefore, ensures nuclear deterrence. Using SSBNs as nuclear deterrents provides high effectiveness that has allowed Great Britain to use SSBNs as the only nuclear weapon carriers while France uses them as major NW carriers (in France, the air component is basically used for tactical purposes). This did not happen in Russia and the USA – why?
First of all, modern SSBNs are very complicated and expensive engineering developments. The cost of Russian development programs is unknown, but in the USA the estimated cost of development and production of 12 advanced SSBNs totals $95.8 billion (without missiles), comparable to the cost of building and operation of a large orbital station. The deployment of an amount of land-based ICBMs comparable to the amount of SLBMs is cheaper while they demonstrate similar effectiveness when delivering a preventive strike or a counterstrike.
Second, only a certain part of SSBNs (and, therefore, SLBMs) may be put on combat alert at any time – submarines require regular long-time maintenance, crew rest and training time. For example, the SSBN fleet in Great Britain traditionally includes four submarines because this is the minimum amount that ensures the combat alert status of at least a single submarine. These results are achieved due to the long-time operational experience and the availability of two full crews for each submarine. The Russian (former Soviet) BMS fleet it traditionally criticized for a lower “time spent underway” coefficient compared to the same coefficient for Western submarines – the accurate data is unknown, but now only one or two submarines are likely to be put on combat alert simultaneously while things are gradually getting better – as far back as five years the constant combat alert status of a single submarine was not provided. Of course, in a “threatening period” a larger amount of submarines may be sent on a mission, but it would be difficult to maintain their deployment in case of a long-time crisis.
On the whole, two above-mentioned factors make a state to spend specifically large amounts of money for the naval component of SNF in order to guarantee the ability to deliver a response strike, on the one hand; on the other hand, the state has to cut down expenses for other components of SNF (and allocating part of the distribution pool limited by the amount of NW if we are talking about the USA and Russia) and to reduce its abilities to deliver a preventive strike or a counterstrike.
Today
In the USA, with the plainly obsolescent land and air components, SSBNs are currently playing the key role in order to ensure nuclear deterrence. So, 14 Ohio-class SSBNs are operational, plus four nuclear submarines of the same class modified into SSBN in 2002–2008 and able to carry up to 154 Tomahawk CMs. In the conditions of nuclear weapon reduction, a certain part of the Ohio-class submarines has been retrofitted because of their excessive firepower - these submarines have been armed with 24 solid-fuelled Trident II D-5 SLBMs, each of which may deliver 8 low- or medium-power warheads (as a result of arms limitation – initially up to 12-14 warheads) within the maximum range of up to 11,000 km (probably, with small payload). As the START-III Treaty was signed, it was decided to reduce the amount of SSBN onboard launchers to 20; however, the biggest part of missiles is not fully armed – the average amount of munitions is four or five. According to the terms and conditions of the START-III Treaty, the parties should meet the requirements for the total amount of munitions only, but they may distribute them at their own discretion. In spite of these measures, by early 2018, when the parties should satisfy the terms and conditions of the START-III Treaty, the U.S. SSBNs (the third part of deployed NW carriers – 240 of total 700) will take two thirds of munitions (approx. 1,100 of 1,550). At that, further reduction of the amount of submarines is not the best solution here as it will lead to a decrease in the amount of patrolling submarines (now, four-five submarines are on a patrol mission simultaneously).
The Ohio-class submarines will be replaced with new Columbia-class SSBNs (formerly known as SSBN-X or Ohio Replacement) by the early 2030s. It is planned to build 12 submarines armed with the same Trident II D-5 missiles (SLBMs are to be replaced only in the 2040s) in the amount reduced to 16. It is considered that a decrease in the amount of submarines and launchers would not have any effect on the total nuclear deterrence potential because new SSBNs will require rarer long-time maintenance while the operational capabilities of a lower amount of the Trident missiles exceed even the current limitations of the START-III Treaty. Further agreements related to arms reduction may make the USA reduce series production of these submarines or additionally decrease the amount of launchers.
Russia’s strategic naval forces are now in the process of critical modernization that explains why they include various types of systems. For the time being, the Russian Navy operates BMSs developed during the Soviet period and the newest systems, such as[i]:
– two Project 667BDR Kalmar-class BMSs: K-223 Podolsk and K-433 Svyatoy Georgiy Pobedonosets, both included in the Pacific Fleet. Another submarine – the K-44 Ryazan – is under repair; it is unclear whether it will be put into service or not;
– five Project 667BDRM Delfin-class BMSs: K-18 Karelia, K-51 Verkhoturye, K-84 Yekaterinburg, K-117 Bryansk, K-407 Novomoskovsk, all included in the Northern Fleet. Another submarine – the K-114 Tula – is under repair that will be completed in the late 2016-early 2017;
– three Project 955 Borei-class BMSs: K-535 Yury Dolgorukiy included in the Northern Fleet, K-550 Alexander Nevsky and K-551 Vladimir Monomakh included in the Pacific Fleet.
The Project 667BDR/BDRM submarines are direct evolutionary developments based on the first Soviet Project 667A BMS. Each BMS of this class is armed with 16 liquid-fuelled R-29RMU2 (RSM-54) Sineva SLBMs supporting up to 10 warheads, with the maximum range of 8,300-11,500 km, depending on arming options. These submarines are being rearmed with modified R-29RMU2.1 Liner missiles that feature new warheads and improved antimissile defence penetration systems. Modified Project 667BDRM submarines are likely to remain operational until the late 2020s. By that time, the program to replace them with advance next-gen BMSs (currently under development) should be launched.
Older BMSs that belong to other classes (including the famous huge Project 941 submarines) should be replaced with the Borei-class submarines being built. The first three BMSs have already been handed over to the Navy, with additional four submarines being built and with the last 8th submarine, the keel-laying of which is to be started before the end of the year. The last five submarines will be built under the improved project; no accurate data on their design features is available, but the same weapon system is confirmed - 16 solid-fuelled R-30 (RSM-56) Bulava SLBMs, with six warheads and the range of up to 9,300 km. As a solid-fuelled missile, the Bulava SLBM offers the following advantages: potentially better ease of operation and compact structure (including reduced requirements for the submarine equipment), lower vulnerability to damage from antimissile systems. Although, speaking of the key parameter like the throw-weight-to-range ratio, this missile is inferior to the Sineva/Liner SLBM and its American equivalent. It should be noted that the throw-weight parameter loses its urgency due to arms reduction agreements while the range parameter has reached its logical limit long time ago. Nonetheless, the Bulava SLBM is likely to be replaced with a new missile in the foreseeable future.
After removing the Project 667BDR submarines from operational status and building all eight Borei-class submarines (to be completed in the early 2020s), Russia’s strategic naval forces will include 14 BMSs. Their status within Russia’s nuclear triad limited by the START III Treaty becomes questionable because the land component has always played the most important role. We should remember that under START-III Treaty’s terms and conditions each SSBN is accounted as the amount of nuclear weapon carriers equal to the amount of SLBMs carried by each submarine, apart from a larger amount of munitions. Probably, this will either make Russian developers retrofit a certain part of the Project 667BDRM submarines into special-purpose submarines or take measures similar to those taken by American submarine developers, i.e. artificially reduce the amount of launchers or arm a part of SSBNs with strategic cruise missiles for naval applications that are undergoing their rebirth stage.
[i] Project 667BDR/BDRM BMSs retrofitted into special-purpose submarines as well as the largest TK-208 Dmitry Donskoy BMS used for SLBM tests are not included
